General Chereshnya Bullet



Ukrainian Purpose-Built High-Speed Drone Interceptor — Anti-Shahed C-UAS

[IMAGE: General Chereshnya Bullet interceptor drone — General Cherry press materials / UMEX 2026 imagery]

Unit Cost (est.): ~$2,100 per unit (confirmed UMEX 2026) | Cost Exchange Ratio vs. Shahed-136 ($50K–$150K): 24:1 to 71:1 in defender's favor | vs. Patriot PAC-3 ($4M): 1,900:1 in defender's favor

IDENTITY & DESIGNATION

Official Designation: General Chereshnya Bullet (also: General Cherry Bullet)

Manufacturer: General Chereshnya (General Cherry) — Ukrainian defense technology company; volunteer-driven startup evolved into top-tier producer

Country of Origin: Ukraine

Year Introduced: Concept 2024; serial production launched October 2025; codified and approved for AFU use December 2025

Program Status: Active serial production; deployed to Armed Forces of Ukraine; exported to Middle East theater with Ukrainian operators March 2026

NATO/Allied Designation: None assigned

Export Status: Deployed to Jordan and Middle East with Ukrainian operators per Zelenskyy confirmation March 2026; AIRO Group (USA) Letter of Intent signed late 2025 for joint venture NATO manufacturing

CLASSIFICATION

Domain: Air

Category: Military — Counter-UAS Interceptor

Sub-Category: Purpose-built high-speed drone interceptor — air-to-air kinetic engagement

Terminal Mode: Expendable — kinetic collision intercept with explosive payload

Expendable: Yes

Size Class: Small — compact quadcopter interceptor

PHYSICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Configuration: X-shaped quadcopter frame — four rotors in X-configuration optimized for high-speed maneuvering and pursuit geometry; bullet-shaped aerodynamic fuselage body

Construction: 3D-printable components; designed for rapid production scaling and field repair without sophisticated manufacturing facilities

Warhead: Explosive payload in domed nose section — kinetic fragmentation on impact with target drone

Airframe: Aerodynamic surfaces and control surfaces optimized for high-speed stability; wind and turbulence resistance; reinforced structure for high-g maneuvering during intercept

Weight: [VERIFY — not publicly disclosed]

Frame Size: [VERIFY — exact dimensions not publicly disclosed; X-configuration]

PROPULSION & PERFORMANCE

Propulsion Type: Hybrid — jet engine plus four electric rotors [VERIFY exact configuration]; high-output propulsion for sprint intercept profile

Max Speed (Serial Production): 309 km/h — sufficient to intercept Shahed-136 cruising at ~180 km/h with ~129 km/h closure margin

Max Speed (Performance Variants): Up to 450 km/h — frontline performance variants for higher-speed targets

Operational Ceiling: Up to 5,500–6,000 meters — enables engagement of targets at altitudes previously unreachable by short-range drone defenses

Endurance: Short duration — mission profile optimized for intercept sprint rather than extended loiter

Primary Target: Shahed-136 and Geran variants (~180 km/h cruise); long-range reconnaissance UAVs; selected low-flying aerial targets

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GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION & CONTROL

Navigation: GPS plus AI-assisted targeting system with real-time data processing and automatic course correction

Terminal Guidance: Variant-dependent — EO camera (day), thermal IR camera (night), active seeker (terminal guidance variant)

AI Integration: Onboard software provides real-time target detection, tracking, and automatic course correction; instantaneous response to target trajectory changes; AI handles terminal phase corrections beyond human reflex capability at intercept closure speeds

Autonomy Level: Semi-autonomous — AI-assisted intercept with operator oversight; operator directs engagement, AI manages terminal guidance

Operator Skill: HIGH — interception timelines measured in seconds demand precision, situational awareness, and confidence in AI-assisted targeting; General Chereshnya Academy established to train interceptor pilots via mobile training teams near operational units

Man-in-Loop Required: Yes — operator directs intercept; AI assists terminal guidance phase

Fiber-Optic Option: Not disclosed

SENSORS & PAYLOADS — THREE VARIANTS

Daytime Variant: Electro-optical (EO) camera for visual target acquisition in daylight conditions

Nighttime Variant: Thermal infrared (IR) camera — same thermal imaging approach used by companion Wild Hornets Sting interceptor

Terminal Guidance Variant: Active seeker for autonomous terminal engagement — reduced operator workload in terminal phase

Primary Mission: Intercept and neutralize Shahed-class one-way attack drones, Geran variants, long-range reconnaissance UAVs, and selected low-altitude aerial threats

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COST & PROCUREMENT

Unit Cost: ~$2,100 per unit — confirmed by company representative at UMEX 2026, Abu Dhabi

Cost vs. Shahed-136: $2,100 vs. $50,000–$150,000 — cost-exchange ratio 24:1 to 71:1 in defender's favor

Cost vs. Patriot PAC-3: $2,100 vs. $4,000,000 — ratio 1,900:1 in defender's favor; Patriot not designed for drone intercept and unsuitable for mass Shahed engagements

Production Rate: Ukraine receiving 1,500+ specialized anti-Shahed interceptor drones per day across all producers as of January 2026; 100,000 interceptors produced in 2025; production capacity grown eightfold

Combat Record: October 2025 alone: General Chereshnya interceptor family (Bullet + AIR models) destroyed at least 548 aerial targets

Fleet Success Rate: Over 80% reported intercept rate across Ukrainian interceptor drone programs

International Demand: AIRO Group (USA) Letter of Intent for joint NATO manufacturing; deployed to Jordan/Middle East March 2026; Zelenskyy confirmed Ukrainian operators deploying with interceptors per US request

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COUNTERMEASURE VULNERABILITY PROFILE

RF Jamming: HIGH — relies on RF control link during intercept approach; contested EW environment is primary operational challenge; short mission duration limits exposure window but terminal phase is highest-jamming-intensity phase of engagement

GPS Spoofing: MODERATE — GPS-dependent navigation; AI visual tracking and thermal/EO seekers provide GPS-independent terminal guidance capability in seeker variants, partially compensating for GPS denial

EMI/EMC Attack: HIGH — commercial and semi-commercial electronics; no confirmed MIL-STD hardening; same vulnerability class as FPV kamikaze and the Shahed-136 it is designed to defeat; this is an accepted design tradeoff for cost and production scale

Microwave Attack: HIGH — unhardened electronics; compact airframe; HPM attack per Coyote Block 3NK approach would be equally effective against Bullet electronics as against Shahed. In current operational context Russia lacks deployed HPM C-UAS — this vulnerability is theoretical not practical

Laser DEW: LOW to MODERATE — at 309–450 km/h with high maneuverability, the Bullet is an extremely difficult laser tracking target; small cross-section; rapid direction changes during intercept geometry

Kinetic Intercept: VERY LOW — faster than most threats it faces; small size; no current adversary has meaningful kinetic counter to interceptor drone in Ukraine operational context

Cyber Attack: LOW to MODERATE — AI-assisted guidance creates some attack surface; military use suggests basic security measures

Overall Vulnerability Rating: MODERATE — electronic vulnerabilities mirror the FPV kamikaze class but are largely theoretical in current operational context; Russia lacks deployed HPM C-UAS; Bullet speed defeats kinetic intercept; short mission profile limits jamming exposure

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CRUISE MISSILE CONVERGENCE NOTES

The Bullet is the defensive mirror image of the convergence thesis. The thesis has mostly focused on offensive drones acquiring cruise missile characteristics through commercial technology cost collapse. The Bullet shows the same cost collapse driving defensive interceptor capability to affordability. A $2,100 platform with AI targeting, thermal imaging, 309 km/h sprint speed, and 6,000 meter ceiling was not buildable at that price in 2020. The same commercial components, 3D printing, and AI software integration that created the Shahed-136 created its counter. The attacker's cost advantage and the defender's cost response are two products of the same technological revolution. The Bullet does not have cruise missile DNA in the traditional sense — it is not a long-range autonomous strike platform. But it represents the convergence thesis applied to the defensive problem: purpose-built, expendable, AI-guided, mass-produced at commercial cost, and effective against the exact class of threat that convergence created.

ENGINEER'S NOTE: *In Engineering Notes Episode One I identified unhardened commercial electronics as the Achilles heel of every attacking drone in this series. The Bullet shares that same vulnerability — it is built on commercial components with no EMI hardening. The irony is precise: the same HPM attack that the Coyote Block 3NK uses to defeat Shahed drones would be equally effective against the Bullet's electronics. This is not a design failure — it is a deliberate cost tradeoff. You cannot build $2,100 interceptors at scale with military-grade EMI hardening on every unit. The Bullet accepts electronic*

vulnerability in exchange for the production economics that allow Ukraine to field 1,500 of them per day. The lesson for the defense industry is that in a high-volume attrition conflict, affordability and scale can outweigh hardening. The Bullet does not need to survive an HPM attack because Russia does not have a deployed HPM C-UAS. When that changes — and it will — the interceptor drone design philosophy will need to evolve. The kinetic intercept approach works now. The HPM approach works now from the other direction. Both are valid. The threat requires both. That is why Engineering Notes Episode One and this data card belong together in the analytical framework.

OPERATIONAL HISTORY

2024: General Chereshnya AIR interceptor developed and deployed — achieved 5,000 confirmed kills; established company as top-tier interceptor producer

October 2025: Bullet unveiled; serial production announced; passes internal testing; begins codification process

December 2025: Bullet codified and approved for Armed Forces of Ukraine use; companion Wild Hornets Sting intercepts first Geran-3 jet-powered Shahed variant

January 2026: Ukraine receiving 1,500+ interceptor drones per day; 100,000 interceptors produced in 2025; production capacity eightfold increase confirmed

February 2026: Bullet unveiled internationally at UMEX 2026 Abu Dhabi; unit cost confirmed at $2,100; X-configuration design details disclosed

March 2026: Ukrainian operators and Bullet interceptors deployed to Jordan per Zelenskyy confirmation; countering Iranian Shahed attacks on US and allied assets in Middle East; AIRO Group LOI for NATO manufacturing signed

Ongoing: Ukraine Ministry of Defense signals drone-on-drone interception as cornerstone of domestic procurement policy going forward

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SOURCES & CROSS-REFERENCES

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[VERIFY]: Exact propulsion configuration; specific frame dimensions; warhead weight; full operator training requirements; exact production numbers per manufacturer

Cross-Ref: See also: Shahed-136 (primary target platform); Raytheon Coyote Block 3NK (HPM alternative intercept approach — Engineering Notes Episode 1); P1-SUN SkyFall (competing Ukrainian interceptor); Wild Hornets Sting (competing Ukrainian interceptor); FPV Kamikaze (shared electronics vulnerability class); ODIN Win_Hit (competing interceptor)